

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTY SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
McHENRY COUNTY, ILLINOIS

PAUL DULBERG,)
Plaintiff,)
) No.: 17 LA 377
v.)
)
THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J.)
POPOVICH, P.C. and HANS MAST,)
Defendants.)

**PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT AT LAW**

NOW COMES, your Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, (hereinafter referred to as "DULBERG") by and through his attorneys, THE GOOCH FIRM, and for his Response to Defendants' THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C. and HANS MAST (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss states to the Court the following:

INTRODUCTION

Defendants brought their Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint at Law, pursuant to Section 2-615. (See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss attached hereto without exhibits as **Exhibit A.**) In their Motion, Defendants argue that DULBERG failed to state a claim for legal malpractice. However, after review of the facts in the Complaint, this Honorable Court will determine that DULBERG's First Amended Complaint is sufficient to survive this Motion to Dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SECTION 2-615

1. A Motion to Dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 attacks the legal sufficiency of the Complaint by alleging defects on its face. *Weisblatt v. Colky*, 265 Ill.App.3d 622, 625 (1st Dist. 1994). Section 2-615 motions "raise but a single issue: whether, when taken as true, the facts

alleged in the Complaint set forth a good and sufficient cause of action.” *Visvardis v. Ferleger* 375 Ill.App.3d 719, 723 (1st Dist. 2007), quoting *Scott Wetzel Services v. Regard*, 271 Ill.App.3d 478, 480, 208 Ill. Dec. 98, 648 N.E.2d 1020 (1995).

2. When the legal sufficiency of a Complaint is challenged by a section 2–615 Motion to Dismiss, all well-pleaded facts in the Complaint are taken as true and a reviewing court must determine whether the allegations of the Complaint, construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. *Vitro v. Mihelcic*, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (2004); *King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp.* 215 Ill.2d 1, 12 (2005). A cause of action should not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved that will entitled the plaintiff to recover. *Zedella v. Gibson*, 165 Ill.2d 181, 185 (1995).

ARGUMENT
(under 2-615)

I. Dulberg sufficiently states a cause of action for legal malpractice against the Defendants.

1. In his First Amended Complaint, DULBERG sufficiently set forth the necessary elements of legal malpractice. “To prevail on a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff client must plead and prove that the defendant attorneys owed the client a duty of due care arising from the attorney-client relationship, that the defendants breached that duty, and that as a proximate result, the client suffered injury.” *Northern Illinois Emergency Physicians v. Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd.*, 216 Ill.2d 294, 306-307 (Ill., 2005).

2. In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants allege that DULBERG has not pled necessary facts. For example, Defendants argue that DULBERG did not plead enough facts as to what necessary discovery was not conducted under paragraph 31(c) of the First Amended Complaint (See Motion to Dismiss attached as **Exhibit A**, pg. 6) This is not true.

3. In that same paragraph, DULBERG gives an example of what type of discovery was necessary, i.e. hiring a liability expert. (See First Amended Complaint, **Exhibit B**, ¶31(c).)

4. Had Defendants conducted expert discovery in DULBERG's case, the expert would have opined as to the liability of both Gagnon and the McGuires. DULBERG's allegations that an expert should have been hired by MAST is proper because had MAST hired an expert prior to releasing the McGuires, the expert could have opined as to their liability which would have resulted in the McGuires staying in the case and DULBERG being able to obtain a much higher mediation award. Further, this opinion should have been made prior to settling with the McGuires in order to determine whether \$5,000.00 was a reasonable amount.

5. In their Motion, Defendants question why DULBERG's subsequent counsel did not retain an expert. (See Motion to Dismiss attached as **Exhibit A**, pg. 7) In fact, DULBERG and his subsequent counsel *did* retain an expert for the mediation and were successful in the mediation due to the expert's opinion as to liability. (See First Amended Complaint, **Exhibit B**, ¶24, 29.) Thus this issue in Defendants' Motion is moot.

6. DULBERG also discussed necessary discovery regarding insurance policies of Gagnon and McGuires. MAST failed to conduct discovery to obtain these insurance policies. This is evidenced in the First Amended Complaint where DULBERG pled that MAST advised him that Gagnon's insurance policy limit was only \$100,000.00, when in reality it was later discovered that the limit was \$300,000.00. (See First Amended Complaint, **Exhibit B**, ¶13, 22.) This shows that MAST did not have the sufficient discovery as to Gagnon's insurance policy.

7. Defendants' next issue with the First Amended Complaint is that DULBERG did not specify the law pertaining to a property owner's duties and responsibilities that MAST

should have been familiar with while representing DULBERG. (See Motion to Dismiss attached as **Exhibit A**, pg. 6.)

8. The law that MAST should have understood under paragraph 31(f) of the First Amended Complaint is premises liability and the liabilities of the parties involved in the underlying case. “Under the Premises Liability Act, the duty owed by a premises owner or occupier to an invitee or a licensee is that of ‘reasonable care under the circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them.’” (internal citation omitted) *Rhodes v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R.*, 172 Ill.2d 213, 228 (Ill., 1996).

9. In this case, DULBERG was an invitee of the McGuires. “An invitee is defined as one who enters the premises of another with the owner’s or occupier’s express or implied consent for the mutual benefit of himself and the owner, or for a purpose connected with the business in which the owner is engaged.” *Rhodes v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R.*, *supra*. The McGuires had a duty of reasonable care to DULBERG as an invitee because DULBERG was on their property for their benefit, to cut down a tree. (See First Amended Complaint, **Exhibit B**, ¶6.)

10. MAST’s failure to become familiar with this law or chainsaw ownership liability, resulted in him coercing and pressuring DULBERG to accept a paltry settlement of \$5,000.00 with the McGuries, when in fact their liability was much more, as presented by the expert during the mediation. Based on this law, MAST would have seen that McGuires as homeowners did in fact owe a duty to DULBERG.

11. Also, had MAST reviewed the law on premises liability, he could have considered the law as to ultrahazardous circumstances and the strict liability of the homeowners. “Illinois has recognized strict liability principally in two instances:” * * * “(2) when a defendant engages

in ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity as determined by the courts, giving particular consideration, *inter alia*, to the appropriateness of the activity to the place where it is maintained, in light of the character of the place and its surroundings.” (internal citations omitted) *Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc.*, 272 Ill.App.3d 263, 266 (2nd Dist., 1995). MAST should have considered strict liability as to the McGuires prior to advising DULBERG to settle.

12. Throughout the First Amended Complaint, DULBERG lists different ways (via email and in person communication) that Defendants falsely advised DULBERG that releasing the McGuires from liability was the proper course to take. (See First Amended Complaint, **Exhibit B**, ¶15-21.)

13. Also, MAST emailed and verbally told DULBERG that if he did not agree to the \$5,000.00 settlement with the McGuires, he would get nothing. (See First Amended Complaint, **Exhibit B**, ¶15-21.)

14. Overall, DULBERG has pled with enough specificity what MAST and/or the Defendants did improperly to breach the standard of care.

15. As to the specific allegations relating to Defendants’ concealment of facts to DULBERG, paragraph 31(k) of the First Amended Complaint, DULBERG stated what was concealed from him by the Defendants. Defendants concealed from DULBERG the actual policy limits from the McGuires and Gagnon, concealed facts relating to the explanation of liability law and what type of duty the McGuires owed to DULBERG, concealed that retaining an expert witness prior to accepting settlement would have been beneficial to DULBERG’s case, and concealed the fact that Defendants were handling everything properly when this was not the truth.

16. The facts pled regarding concealment are sufficiently pled in DULBERG's First Amended Complaint and must be taken as true in a Section 2-615 Motion.

17. Next, Defendants argue without any authority that DULBERG was not coerced because he had time to deliberate over the decision to settle. (See Motion to Dismiss attached as **Exhibit A**, pg. 7.) This is not true.

18. DULBERG's exhibits to the First Amended Complaint as well as the pleading itself demonstrate how MAST coerced DULBERG into the settlement with the McGuires.

19. DULBERG pled that MAST essentially gave him two options: to take the \$5,000.00 settlement or get nothing. DULBERG was coerced into this decision because he was unaware of any other option and forced to take the only available option.

20. On multiple occasions, MAST told DULBERG, via email, to accept the settlement otherwise the McGuires will get out of the case for free. (See First Amended Complaint, **Exhibit B**, ¶15, 16.)

21. DULBERG also pled that MAST verbally told him that he had no choice but to execute a release of the McGuires and accept the \$5,000.00. (See First Amended Complaint, **Exhibit B**, ¶17.)

22. Defendants also argue that Exhibit E to the First Amended Complaint shows that DULBERG had time to deliberate over the decision and thus could not have been coerced. (See Motion to Dismiss attached as **Exhibit A**, pg. 7.) This is not true.

23. Exhibit E to the First Amended Complaint is an email from DULBERG to MAST stating that the release was signed and put in the mail. Exhibit E further shows DULBERG's continued hesitation over the \$5,000.00 settlement however, based on the information that

MAST had told him, DULBERG said that he “trusted his judgment”. See Exhibit E to the First Amended Complaint.

24. “Coercion” and “duress” have essentially the same meaning: overpowering another's free will by imposition, oppression, or undue influence. *Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp.*, 341 Ill.App.3d 438, 446 (4th Dist., 2003). MAST continuous verbal and written threats to accept the settlement or get nothing resulted in DULBERG thinking (based on what his attorney was telling him) that he had no other choice but to accept this small settlement.

25. More importantly, whether DULBERG was coerced or acted willingly is a question of fact. *Schwartz v. Schwartz*, 29 Ill.App. 516, 527 (4th Dist., 1889).

26. The pleading and exhibit show that DULBERG made the decision to settle after meeting with MAST in person, and MAST telling him that he had no choice but to accept the settlement. DULBERG acted quickly to accept the settlement based on the information that MAST told him that if he would not accept it, the offer would be withdrawn and the McGuires would be successful on a summary judgment motion.

27. Simply because Exhibit E states that the release was mailed weeks later, does not mean that DULBERG was not coerced into accepting the settlement based on the information that he was given by his attorney whom he trusted.

28. In any event, the issue of coercion must be left to the trier of fact to decide after all evidence is obtained and at this point, determining a factual question on a Motion to Dismiss would be inappropriate.

29. Last Defendants raise the issue of proximate cause as to MAST's improper determination of Gagnon's insurance coverage limit being \$300,000.00 and not \$100,000.00.

(See Motion to Dismiss attached as **Exhibit A**, pg. 7.) As argued above, this allegation supports DULBERG's argument that MAST did not conduct the proper discovery, as evidenced by the incorrect policy limit. Had MAST not breached the standard of care and had he conducted proper discovery, DULBERG would have had the correct policy amount for Gagnon, and would have the insurance policy for the McGuires in order to make an informed decision as to settlement.

30. In DULBERG's case, he was forced to settle for an amount less than he would have reasonably received. After mediation, DULBERG was allowed only to recover to the extent of Gagnon's policy limits. (See First Amended Complaint, **Exhibit B**, ¶24, 27, 29.) Had MAST not allowed the release of the McGuires, DULBERG could have reasonably been able to collect the remainder of the mediation award against the McGuires. "Attorney malpractice action should be allowed where it can be shown that the plaintiff had to settle for a lesser amount than she could reasonably expect without the malpractice." *Brooks v. Brennan*, 255 Ill.App. 3d 260, 270 (5th Dist., 1994). Thus, DULBERG properly brought a malpractice against the Defendants.

31. The allegations set forth as to the legal malpractice by DULBERG in his First Amended Complaint are not conclusions and when taken as true, are sufficient to withstand a Section 2-615 dismissal.

32. DULBERG has proven that the actions and inactions of the Defendants have caused DULBERG damages. (See First Amended Complaint, **Exhibit B**, ¶31, 32.) Any dispute as to the proximate cause and damages must be left to the jury as it is a factual question. The issues of proximate cause and damages must be determined by a jury or trier of fact after all proper evidence and testimony is presented at trial. Proximate cause is a **question of fact** to be decided by a jury. (internal citation omitted) (Emphasis added) *Hooper v. County of Cook*, 366 Ill.App.3d 1, 7 (1st Dist., 2006). "The determination of damages is a **question of fact** that is

within the discretion of the jury and is entitled to substantial deference.” (Emphasis added.)
Linhart v. Bridgeview Creek Development, Inc., 391 Ill.App.3d 630, 636 (1st Dist., 2009).

33. Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss are requiring of DULBERG to plead his entire case in a single Complaint. “Plaintiff is not required to prove his case at this stage of the pleadings and the damages as alleged are sufficient to show he was damaged by Defendants’ actions and cause of action for legal malpractice. *Fox v. Seiden, supra*, at 294; *Platson v. NSM America, Inc.*, 322 Ill.App. 3d 138, 143 (2nd Dist., 2001) (‘Cases are not to be tried at the pleadings stage, so a claimant need only show a possibility of recovery, not an absolute right to recover, to survive a 2-615 Motion.’). Here, DULBERG has shown at least a possibility of recovery based on the malpractice of Defendants, thus should survive Defendants’ 2-615 Motion.


34. Accordingly, this Honorable Court should deny Defendants’ Motion in order to allow the case to be fully and properly litigated.

CONCLUSION

After review of the allegations in the First Amended Complaint and taking the allegations as true, this Honorable Court must find that DULBERG has properly stated and pled a claim for legal malpractice. More importantly, due to the factual questions in this case, granting the Motion to Dismiss would be inappropriate. However, in the event this Court grants the Motion, DULBERG requests a reasonable time to file a Second Amended Complaint to include any other facts this Court deems appropriate.

WHEREFORE your Plaintiff PAUL DULBERG prays this Honorable Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and for all other relief this Honorable Court deems equitable and just. If this Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, PAUL DULBERG prays for a reasonable amount of time to file a Second Amended Complaint.

Respectfully submitted by
THE GOOCH FIRM, on behalf of
PAUL DULBERG, Plaintiff,



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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MCHENRY COUNTY, ILLINOIS

PAUL DULBERG,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	No. 17LA000377
	)	
THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J.	)	
POPOVICH, P.C., and HANS MAST,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AT LAW

Defendants, LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C., and HANS MAST, by and through their attorneys, GEORGE K. FLYNN, and CLAUSEN MILLER P.C., pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-615, submit this Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at Law with prejudice, and state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiff Paul Dulberg ("Dulberg") retained defendants The Law Offices of Thomas J. Popovich P.C. ("Popovich") to prosecute a personal injury claim on his behalf against his next door neighbors, Carolyn and Bill McGuire and their adult son (Dulberg's lifelong friend), David Gagnon ("Gagnon")). Hans Mast ("Mast") handled the case for the firm. Dulberg was on the McGuires' property, assisting Gagnon trim some tree branches with a chainsaw, when Dulberg's right arm was lacerated by the chainsaw. Dulberg agreed to a settlement with the McGuires. Thereafter, he and Mast reached an impasse. Mast and the firm withdrew, and successor counsel continued to prosecute the case against Gagnon.

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Dulberg now has a case of “buyer’s remorse,” admitting that he reluctantly agreed to accept the McGuires’ settlement offer. He has attempted to state a claim against Popovich and Mast for legal malpractice. However, he has not plead the requisite elements of a legal malpractice case against Popovich and Mast, or the requisite elements of the underlying case (the “case within the case”).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed his single count Complaint at Law for legal malpractice. Defendants moved to dismiss. On May 10, 2018, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/615 (see Order attached as Exhibit 1). During the hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Judge Meyer ordered that the Plaintiff plead with more particularity and specificity regarding any allegations that he was misled. The Court also ordered the Plaintiff to provide more specificity and particularity with respect to any claims that information provided by Defendants to the Plaintiff was false and misleading. Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint at Law on June 7, 2018.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Following Facts Can Be Gleaned From The First Amended Complaint (Exhibit 2) and Its Exhibits

On June 28, 2011, Dulberg was assisting David Gagnon in the cutting down of a tree on the property of Carolyn and Bill McGuire. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 6). Gagnon lost control of the chainsaw and caused personal injury to Dulberg. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 7). In May of 2012, Dulberg retained Popovich. (Exhibit 2, ¶8). On May 15, 2012, Mast filed a Complaint on behalf of Dulberg against Gagnon and the McGuires in the Circuit Court of McHenry County, Illinois, Case No, 12

LA 178. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 9, and Exhibit 2B)¹. In late 2013, Dulberg settled with the McGuires and executed a Release in their favor in exchange for the payment of \$5,000.00. The McGuires and their insurance carrier, Auto Owners Insurance Company, were released. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 18 and Exhibit 2D). Defendants continued to represent Dulberg until March 2015. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 21). Dulberg retained successor counsel and proceeded to a binding mediation and received a mediation award (Exhibit 2, ¶ 24 and Exhibit 2G). After the mediation, Dulberg allegedly realized for the first time that the information Mast and Popovich had given him was false and misleading and that the dismissal of the McGuires was a serious and substantial mistake. He was advised to seek an independent opinion from an attorney handling legal malpractice matters and received that opinion on or about December 16, 2016. (Exhibit 2, ¶ 28-29).

B. Alleged Acts of Negligence

Popovich's and Mast's alleged malpractice revolves around the settlement of the underlying case between Dulberg and McGuires. The allegations of a breach of the standard of care are all contained in ¶ 31, subsections a) through o) inclusive. Paragraph 31 states as follows:

31. MAST and POPOVICH, jointly and severally, breached the duties owed DULBERG by violating the standard of care owed DULBERG in the following ways and respects:

- a) Failed to take such actions as were necessary during their representation of DULBERG to fix liability against the property owners of the subject property (the McGuires) who employed Gagnon, and sought the assistance of DULBERG, for example hiring a liability expert;
- b) Failed to thoroughly investigate liability issues against property owners of the subject property;

¹ The exhibits to the underlying complaint in Case No. 12 LA 178 will be referenced as Exhibits 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E, 2F, and 2G.

- c) Failed to conduct necessary discovery, so as to fix the liability of the property owners to DULBERG, for example hiring a liability expert;
- d) Failed to investigate the insurance policy amounts of the McGuires and Gagnon;
- e) Incorrectly informed DULBERG that Gagnon's insurance policy was "only \$100,000.00" and no insurance company would pay close to that;
- f) Failed to understand the law pertaining to a property owner's rights, duties and responsibilities to someone invited onto their property by consulting an expert regarding these issues;
- g) Improperly urged DULBERG to accept a nonsensical settlement from the property owners, and dismissed them from all further responsibility;
- h) Failed to appreciate and understand further moneys could not be received as against Gagnon, and that the McGuires and their obvious liability were a very necessary party to the litigation;
- i) Falsely advised DULBERG throughout the period of their representation, that the actions taken regarding the McGuires was proper in all ways and respects, and that DULBERG had no choice but to accept the settlement;
- j) Coerced DULBERG, verbally and through emails, into accepting the settlement with the McGuires for \$5,000.00 by misleading him into believing that [sic] had no other choice but to accept the settlement or else "the McGuires will get out for FREE on a motion".
- k) Concealed from DULBERG the necessary facts for him to make an informed decision as to the McGuires, instead coercing him verbally and through emails into signing a release and settlement agreement and accept a paltry sum of \$5,000.00 for what was a grievous injury;
- l) Failed to properly explain to DULBERG all ramifications of accepting the McGuire settlement, and giving him the option of retaining alternative counsel to review the matter;
- m) Continually reassured DULBERG that the course of action as to the property owners was proper and appropriate;

- n) Failed to retain a liability expert to prove DULBERG's damages;
- o) Were otherwise negligent in their representation of DULBERG.

IV. DULBERG FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE UNDER 735 ILCS 5/2-615

A. Legal Standard

It is clearly established that Illinois is a fact pleading jurisdiction, requiring the plaintiff to present a legally and factually sufficient complaint. *Winfrey v. Chicago Park Dist.*, 274 Ill. App. 3d 939, 942 (1st Dist. 1995). A plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to bring his or her claim within the cause of action asserted. *Jackson vs. South Holland Dodge*, 197 Ill. 2d 39 (2001). To pass muster a complaint must state a cause of action in two ways: first, it must be legally sufficient -- it must set forth a legally recognized claim as its avenue of recovery, and second, the complaint must be factually sufficient -- it must plead facts, which bring the claim within a legally recognized cause of action as alleged. *People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc.*, 88 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (1981). Dismissal of a complaint is mandatory if one fails to meet both requirements. *Misselhorn v. Doyle*, 257 Ill. App. 3d 983, 985 (5th Dist. 1994). In ruling on a Section 2-615 motion, "only those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters of which the court can take judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record may be considered." *Mount Zion State Bank and Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc.*, 169 Ill. 2d 110, 115 (1995).

In Illinois, to establish a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must plead and prove the existence of an attorney client relationship; a duty arising from that relationship; a breach of that duty, the proximate causal relationship between the breach of duty and the damage sustained; and actual damages. *Glass v. Pitler*, 276 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349 (1st Dist. 1995). The injuries

resulting from legal malpractice are not personal injuries but pecuniary injuries to intangible property interests. *Glass* at 349. Damages must be incurred and are not presumed. *Glass* at 349. It is the plaintiff's burden to establish that "but for" the attorney's negligence, the client would not have suffered the damages alleged. *Glass* at 349. "The proximate cause element of legal malpractice claim requires that the plaintiff show that but for the attorney's malpractice, the client would have been successful in the undertaking the attorney was retained to perform. *Green v. Papa*, 2014 IL App. (5th) 1330029 (2014), quoting *Owens v. McDermott Will & Emery*, 316 Ill. App. 340 (1st Dist. 2000), at 351. The plaintiff in a legal malpractice claim must plead a case within the case. *Ignarski v. Norbut*, 271 Ill. App. 3d 522 (1st Dist.1995).

B. Dulberg Fails to Plead Facts in Support of His Conclusory Allegations

Dulberg's second attempt at stating a claim fails no better than his first. He still fails to plead with specificity and particularity as to how he was misled, or how any information provided to him was false and misleading. His allegations are pled in conclusory fashion throughout. He also fails to plead any facts concerning the McGuires' liability in the underlying case. His allegations concern the viability of a tort claim against property owners. Accordingly, he must plead facts in support of the property owners' [the McGuires] liability in the underlying case. Instead, Dulberg pleads only conclusions. More is necessary under Illinois law.

Dulberg has failed to follow the court's direction from the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The allegations of negligence contained in ¶ 31 fail to allege any facts in support of the conclusions. For example, what necessary discovery was not conducted? (¶ 31 (c)) What is the law pertaining to a property owner's duties and responsibilities? (¶ 31 (f)). How did defendants falsely advise Dulberg that the actions taken regarding the McGuires was proper? (¶ 31 (i)). What was concealed from Dulberg? (¶ 31 (k)). The bottom line is that Dulberg has yet to explain how the McGuires would have been found liable. The only thing that can be gleaned

from the facts alleged in the Complaint and First Amended Complaint, is that Dulberg was injured on their property. He fails to explain how the McGuire's breached any duty to him, and how they would have been liable.

Additionally, Dulberg's allegations of coercion are not supported by his own pleadings. It is reasonably inferred from the pleadings that Dulberg had ample time to retain another attorney (in fact later he did). Exhibit E to his First Amended Complaint establishes that he deliberated over the decision to settle, and mailed a signed release back to Mast. So how was he coerced, when he alleges that he met with Mast, and then later mailed the executed release?

Moreover, his allegations regarding the failure to retain an expert are unsupported. He also fails to explain why his successor counsel did not retain an expert at the appropriate time if necessary. Lastly, Dulberg can never properly allege proximately caused damages regarding the allegation in ¶ 31 (e), that Gagnon's insurance coverage was \$300,000 and not \$100,000. In fact, Dulberg admits in ¶ 24 that he recovered \$300,000 in available coverage from Gagnon. If Mast incorrectly reported the available coverage, it did not cause any damage, as Dulberg's successor counsel was apparently able to recover the full amount of available coverage against the individual who injured Dulberg with a chainsaw.

Under Illinois fact pleading requirements, much more is needed. In a case of alleged professional liability, the plaintiff cannot simply allege in conclusory terms that the defendants were negligent, and that the Plaintiff could have proved up liability against the underlying defendants. He must allege why and how. Dulberg has failed twice. His First Amended Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-615.


V. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Defendants, LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C., and HANS MAST, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-615 respectfully request this Honorable Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice, and for any further relief this Court deems fair and proper.

/s/ George K. Flynn

GEORGE K. FLYNN
CLAUSEN MILLER P.C.

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4. That due to the actions and status of MAST in relation to POPOVICH, the actions and inactions of MAST are directly attributable to his employer, partnership, or principal, being THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPVICH, P.C.

5. Venue is therefore claimed proper in McHenry County, Illinois, as the Defendants transact substantial and regular business in and about McHenry County in the practice of law, where their office is located.

6. On or about June 28, 2011, your Plaintiff, DULBERG was involved in a horrendous accident, having been asked by his neighbors Caroline McGuire and William McGuire, in assisting a David Gagnon in the cutting down of a tree on the McGuire property. DULBERG lived in the same area.

7. At this time, Gagnon lost control of the chainsaw he was using causing it to strike and cut DULBERG's arm. This caused substantial and catastrophic injuries to DULBERG, including but not limited to great pain and suffering, current as well as future medical expenses, in an amount in excess of \$260,000.00, along with lost wages in excess of \$250,000.00, and various other damages.

8. In May of 2012, DULBERG retained THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C., pursuant to a written retainer agreement attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.

9. A copy of the Complaint filed by MAST on his own behalf, and on behalf of DULBERG, is attached hereto as **Exhibit B**, and the allegations of that Complaint are fully incorporated into this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

10. An implied term of the retainer agreement attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, was that at all times, the Defendants would exercise their duty of due care towards their client and conform their acts and actions within the standard of care every attorney owes his client.

11. That as **Exhibit B** reveals, Defendants properly filed suit against not only the operator of the chain saw, but also his principals, Caroline McGuire and William McGuire, who purportedly were supervising him in his work on the premises.

12. At the time of filing of the aforesaid Complaint, MAST certified pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137, that he had made a diligent investigation of the facts and circumstances around the Complaint he filed, and further had ascertained the appropriate law. MAST evidently believed a very good and valid cause of action existed against Caroline McGuire and William McGuire.

13. Also MAST incorrectly informed DULBERG that the insurance policy limit for the Gagnon was only \$100,000.00, when in reality the policy was \$300,000.00.

14. The matter proceeded through the normal stages of litigation until sometime in late 2013 or early 2014, when MAST began urging DULBERG to settle the matter against William McGuire and Caroline McGuire for \$5,000.00.

15. On November 18, 2013, MAST wrote two emails to DULBERG urging DULBERG to accept the \$5,000.00, "the McGuire's atty has offered us (you) \$5,000 in full settlement of the claim against the McGuires only. As we discussed, they have no liability in the case for what Dave did as property owners. So they will likely get out of the case on a motion at some point, so my suggestion is to take the \$5,000 now. You probably won't see any of it due to liens etc. but it will offset the costs deducted from any eventual recovery...." * * * "So if we do not accept their 5000 they will simply file a motion and get out of the case for free. That's the only other option is letting them file motion getting out of the case". (See Emails attached as **Group Exhibit C.**)

16. Similarly, on November 20, 2013 MAST emailed DULBERG urging him to accept the \$5,000.00 otherwise "the McGuires will get out for FREE on a motion." (See Emails attached as **Group Exhibit C.**)

17. On or around December 2013 or January 2014, MAST met with DULBERG and other family members and again advised them there was no cause of action against William McGuire and Caroline McGuire, and verbally told DULBERG that he had no choice but to execute a release in favor of the McGuires for the sum of \$5,000.00 and if he did not, he would get nothing.

18. DULBERG, having no choice in the matter, reluctantly agreed with MAST to accept the sum of \$5,000.00 releasing not only William and Caroline McGuire, but also Auto-Owners Insurance Company from any further responsibility or liability in the matter. A copy of the aforesaid general release and settlement agreement is attached hereto as **Exhibit D.**

19. Continuously throughout the period of representation, MAST and POPOVICH represented repeatedly to DULBERG there was no possibility of any liability against William and/or Caroline McGuire and/or Auto-Owners Insurance Company, and lulled DULBERG into believing that the matter was being properly handled

20. After accepting the \$5,000 settlement, DULBERG wrote MAST an email on January 29, 2014 stating "I trust your judgment." (See Email attached as **Exhibit E.**)

21. MAST and POPOVICH continued to represent DULBERG into 2015 and continuously assured him that his case was being handled properly.

22. On February 22, 2015, as to any chance of settling the remainder of his case against Gagnon MAST wrote to DULBERG that, "There's only \$100,000 in coverage. Allstate will never offer anything near the policy limits therefore there's no chance to settle the case. The only

alternative is to take the case to trial and I am not interested in doing that.” (See Email attached as **Exhibit F**.)

23. MAST and POPOVICH represented DULBERG through to and including March of 2015, following which DULBERG and the Defendants terminated their relationship due to a claimed failure of communication. MAST and POPOVICH withdrew from the representation of DULBERG.

24. Thereafter, DULBERG retained other attorneys and proceeded to a Court ordered binding mediation before a retired Circuit Judge, where DULBERG received a binding mediation award of \$660,000.00 in gross, and a net award of \$561,000.00. However, due to the settlement with the McGuires, DULBERG was only able to collect \$300,000.00 based upon the insurance policy available. A copy of the aforesaid Mediation Award is attached hereto as **Exhibit G**.

25. The McGuires were property owners and had property insurance covering injuries or losses on their property, as well as substantial personal assets, including the property location where the accident took place at 1016 West Elder Avenue, in the City of McHenry, Illinois. McGuires were well able to pay all, or a portion of the binding mediation award had they still remained parties.

26. DULBERG, in his relationship with POPOVICH and MAST, cooperated in all ways with them, furnishing all necessary information as required, and frequently conferred with them.

27. Until the time of the mediation award, DULBERG had no reason to believe he could not recover the full amount of his injuries, based on POPOVICH’S and MAST’S representations to DULBERG that he could recover the full amount of his injuries from Gagnon, and that the inclusion of the McGuires would only complicate the case.

28. Following the execution of the mediation agreement and the final mediation award, DULBERG realized for the first time in December of 2016 that the information MAST and POPOVICH had given DULBERG was false and misleading, and that in fact, the dismissal of the McGuires was a serious and substantial mistake.

29. It was not until the mediation in December 2016, based on the expert's opinions that DULBERG retained for the mediation, that DULBERG became reasonably aware that MAST and POPOVICH did not properly represent him by pressuring and coercing him to accept a settlement for \$5,000.00 on an "all or nothing" basis.

30. DULBERG was advised to seek an independent opinion from a legal malpractice attorney and received that opinion on or about December 16, 2016.

31. MAST and POPOVICH, jointly and severally, breached the duties owed DULBERG by violating the standard of care owed DULBERG in the following ways and respects:

a) Failed to take such actions as were necessary during their representation of DULBERG to fix liability against the property owners of the subject property (the McGuires) who employed Gagnon, and sought the assistance of DULBERG, for example hiring a liability expert;

b) Failed to thoroughly investigate liability issues against property owners of the subject property;

c) Failed to conduct necessary discovery, so as to fix the liability of the property owners to DULBERG, for example hiring a liability expert;

d.) Failed to investigate the insurance policy amounts of the McGuires and Gagnon;

e.) Incorrectly informed DULBERG that Gagnon's insurance policy was "only \$100,000.00" and no insurance company would pay close to that;

- f) Failed to understand the law pertaining to a property owner's rights, duties and responsibilities to someone invited onto their property by consulting an expert regarding these issues;
- g) Improperly urged DULBERG to accept a nonsensical settlement from the property owners, and dismissed them from all further responsibility;
- h) Failed to appreciate and understand further moneys could not be received as against Gagnon, and that the McGuires and their obvious liability were a very necessary party to the litigation;
- i) Falsely advised DULBERG throughout the period of their representation, that the actions taken regarding the McGuires was proper in all ways and respects, and that DULBERG had no choice but to accept the settlement;
- j) Coerced DULBERG, verbally and through emails. into accepting the settlement with the McGuires for \$5,000.00 by misleading him into believing that had no other choice but to accept the settlement or else "the McGuires will get out for FREE on a motion".
- k) Concealed from DULBERG the necessary facts for him to make an informed decision as to the McGuires, instead coercing him verbally and through emails into signing a release and settlement agreement and accept a paltry sum of \$5,000.00 for what was a grievous injury;
- l) Failed to properly explain to DULBERG all ramifications of accepting the McGuire settlement, and giving him the option of retaining alternative counsel to review the matter;
- m) Continually reassured DULBERG that the course of action as to the property owners was proper and appropriate;


- n) Failed to retain a liability expert to prove DULBERG's damages;
- o) Were otherwise negligent in their representation of DULBERG.

32. That DULBERG suffered serious and substantial damages, not only as a result of the injury as set forth in the binding mediation award, but due to the direct actions of MAST and POPOVICH in urging DULBERG to release the McGuires, lost the sum of well over \$300,000.00 which would not have occurred but for the acts of MAST and THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C.

WHEREFORE, your Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG prays this Honorable Court to enter judgment on such verdict as a jury of twelve (12) shall return, together with the costs of suit and such other and further relief as may be just, all in excess of the jurisdictional minimums of this Honorable Court.


Respectfully submitted by,

PAUL DULBERG, Plaintiff, by his
attorneys THE GOOCH FIRM,



Thomas W. Gooch, III

PLAINTIFF HEREBY DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY OF TWELVE (12) PERSONS:



Thomas W. Gooch, III


Thomas W. Gooch, III
THE GOOCH FIRM
209 S. Main Street
Wauconda, IL 60084
847-526-0110
ARDC No.: 3123355
gooch@goochfirm.com
office@goochfirm.com

CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES

I agree to employ the LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C. (hereinafter "my attorney") to represent me in the prosecution or settlement of my claim against persons or entities responsible for causing me to suffer injuries and damages on the _____ day of _____, 20____.

My attorney agrees to make no charge for legal services unless a recovery is made in my claim. The approval of any settlement amount cannot be made without my knowledge and consent.

I agree to pay my attorney in consideration for his legal services a sum equal to one-third (33 1/3%) of my recovery from my claim by suit or settlement; this will increase to ~~10%~~ % in the event my claim results in more than one (1) trial and/or an appeal of a trial. I understand my attorney may need to incur reasonable expenses in properly handling my claim including, but not limited to, expenses such as accident reports, filing fees, court reporters fees, video fees, records fees, and physician fees. I understand those expenses will be taken out of my settlement, in addition to my attorney's legal fee.


Client

Client

Date: _____

LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH

By: 

Date: _____

LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C.
3416 West Elm Street
McHenry, Illinois 60050
815/344-3797

EXHIBIT

A

COPY

MAY 15 2012

KATHARINE M. KADY
McHENRY CITY, ILL. CLK.

STATE OF ILLINOIS)
COUNTY OF McHENRY)

SS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
McHENRY COUNTY, ILLINOIS

PAUL DULBERG,

Plaintiff,

vs.

No.:

17LA178

DAVID GAGNON, Individually, and as
Agent of CAROLINE MCGUIRE and BILL
MCGUIRE, and CAROLINE MCGUIRE
and BILL MCGUIRE, Individually,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

NOW COMES the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, by his attorneys, LAW OFFICES OF
THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C., and complaining against the Defendants, DAVID GAGNON,
Individually, and as Agent of CAROLINE MCGUIRE and BILL MCGUIRE, and CAROLINE
MCGUIRE and BILL MCGUIRE, individually, and states as follows:

Count 1

Paul Dulberg vs. David Gagnon, individually, and as Agent of Caroline and Bill McGuire

1. On June 28, 2011, the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, lived in the City of McHenry,
County of McHenry, Illinois.
2. On June 28, 2011, Defendants CAROLINE MCGUIRE and BILL MCGUIRE
lived, controlled, managed and maintained a single family home located at 1016 W. Elder
Avenue, in the City of McHenry, County of McHenry, Illinois.

NOTICE
BY LOCAL RULE 3.10
THIS CASE IS HEREBY SET FOR SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE IN COURTROOM 206 ON
JULY 18, 2012, AT 2:00 PM
FAILURE TO APPEAR MAY RESULT IN THE CASE
BEING DISMISSED OR AN ORDER OF
DEFAULT BEING ENTERED.

NOTICE
LOCAL RULE 3.10
THIS CASE IS HEREBY SET FOR SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE IN COURTROOM 206 ON
JULY 18, 2012, AT 2:00 PM
FAILURE TO APPEAR MAY RESULT IN THE CASE
BEING DISMISSED OR AN ORDER OF
DEFAULT BEING ENTERED.

EXHIBIT

B

3. On June 28, 2011, the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, was living and/or staying at his parent's home at 1016 W. Elder Avenue, in the City of McHenry, County of McHenry, Illinois.

4. On June 28, 2011, the Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE contracted, hired the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, to cut down, trim and/or maintain the trees and brush at their premises at 1016 W. Elder Avenue, in the City of McHenry, County of McHenry, Illinois.

5. On June 28, 2011, and at the request and with the authority and permission of the Defendants CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, and for their benefit, the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, was working under their supervision and control while engaged in cutting, trimming and maintaining trees and brush at the premises at 1016 W. Elder Avenue, in the City of McHenry, County of McHenry, Illinois.

6. On June 28, 2011, as part of his work at the subject property, the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, was authorized, instructed, advised and permitted to use a chainsaw to assist him in his work for Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, which was owned by the McGuires.

7. On June 28, 2011, the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, was under the supervision and control of Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, and was working as their apparent and actual agent, and was then acting and working in the scope of his agency for Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE.

8. On June 28, 2011, and while the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, was working in the course and scope of his agency for Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, and was under their supervision and control, Defendant, DAVID GAGNON was in use of a chainsaw while trimming a tree and branch.

9. On June 28, 2011, and while Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, was in use of a chainsaw while trimming a tree and branch, Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, asked for and/or requested the assistance of the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, to hold the tree branch while Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, trimmed the branch with the chainsaw.

10. On June 28, 2011, and while Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, was in sole control, use and operation of the subject chainsaw, the chainsaw was caused to strike and injure the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG.

11. At all relevant times, Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, knew of Defendant, DAVID GAGNON's use of the chainsaw in the presence of the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, and knew that such created a danger to the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG's safety.

12. That at all relevant times, the Defendants, DAVID GAGNON, as agent of CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, owed a duty to use care and caution in his operation of a known dangerous instrumentality.

13. On June 28, 2011, the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, was negligent in one or more of the following ways:

- a. Failed to maintain control over the operating of the chainsaw;
- b. Failed to take precaution not to allow the chainsaw to move toward the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, so as to cause injury;
- c. Failed to warn the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, of the dangers existing from the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON's inability to control the chainsaw;
- d. Failed to keep a proper distance from the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, while operating the chainsaw;
- e. Otherwise was negligent in operation and control of the chainsaw.

14. That as a proximate result of the Defendant's negligence, the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, was injured externally; he has experienced and will in the future experience pain and suffering; he has been permanently scarred and/or disabled; and has become obligated for large sums of money for medical bills and will in the future become obligated for additional sums of money for medical care, and has lost time from work and/or from earning wages due to such injury.

15. That at the above time and date, the Defendant's negligence can be inferred from the circumstances of the occurrence as the instrument of the injury was under the control of the Defendant and therefore, negligence can be presumed under the doctrine of *Res Ipsa Loquitur*.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, demands judgment against Defendants, DAVID GAGNON, and CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE in an amount in excess of \$50,000.00, plus costs of this action.

Count II

Paul Dulberg vs. Caroline McGuire and Bill McGuire

15. That the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, restates and realleges paragraphs 1 through 14, in Count I, above, as paragraphs 1 through 13 of Count II, as if fully alleged herein.

16. That at all relevant times, the Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, owned, controlled, maintained and supervised the premises whereat the accident to the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, occurred.

17. That at all relevant times, the Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, were in control of and had the right to advise, instruct and demand that the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, act or work in a safe and reasonable manner.

18. That at all relevant times, the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON, was acting as the agent, actual and apparent, of Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, and was acting at their request and in their best interests and to their benefit as in a joint enterprise.

19. That at all relevant times, Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, knew DAVID GAGNON was operating a chainsaw with the assistance of the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, and had the right to discharge or terminate the Defendant, DAVID GAGNON's work for any reason.

20. That at all relevant times, Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, owed a duty to supervise and control Defendant, DAVID GAGNON's activities on the property so as not to create a unreasonable hazard to others, including the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG.


21. On June 28, 2011, the Defendants, CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, were negligent in one or more of the following ways:

- a. Failed to control operation of the chainsaw;
- b. Failed to take precaution not to allow the chainsaw to move toward the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, so as to cause injury;
- c. Failed to warn the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, of the dangers existing from the Defendant's inability to control the chainsaw;
- d. Failed to keep the chainsaw a proper distance from the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, while operating the chainsaw;
- e. Otherwise was negligent in operation and control of the chainsaw.

22. That as a proximate result of the Defendant's negligence, the Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, was injured externally; he has experienced and will in the future experience pain and suffering; he has been permanently scarred and/or disabled; and has become obligated for large sums of money for medical bills and will in the future become obligated for additional sums of money for medical care, and has lost time from work and/or from earning wages due to such injury.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PAUL DULBERG, demands judgment against Defendants,
CAROLINE McGUIRE and BILL McGUIRE, in an amount in excess of \$50,000.00, plus costs
of this action.

LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C.



One of the Attorneys for Plaintiff

Hans A. Mast
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C.
3416 West Elm Street
Lake, Illinois 60050
(815) 344-3797
ARDC No. 03203684

From: Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net>
Subject: Fwd: Dave's Best and oldest friend John
Date: December 28, 2016 10:33:35 AM CST
To: paul_dulberg@comcast.net

From: Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net>
Date: November 20, 2013 at 7:26:53 AM CST
To: Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net>
Subject: Re: Dave's Best and oldest friend John

Morning Hans,
Ok we can meet. I will call Sheila today and set up a time.
Please send me a link to the current Illinois statute citing that the property owner is not liable for work done on their property resulting in injury to a neighbor.
I need to read it myself and any links to recent case law in this area would be helpful as well.
Thanks,
Paul

Paul Dulberg
847-497-4250
Sent from my iPad

On Nov 20, 2013, at 6:59 AM, Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net> wrote:

Paul, lets meet again to discuss. The legality of it all is that a property owner does not have legal liability for a worker (whether friend, son or otherwise) who does the work on his time, using his own independent skills. Here, I deposed the McGuires, and they had nothing to do with how Dave did the work other than to request the work to be done. They had no control on how Dave wielded the chain saw and cut you. its that simple. We don't have to accept the \$5,000, but if we do not, the McGuires will get out for FREE on a motion. So that's the situation.

----- Original Message -----

From: Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net>
To: Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net>
Sent: Tue, 19 Nov 2013 02:29:56 -0000 (UTC)
Subject: Re: Dave's Best and oldest friend John

I still don't get how they don't feel responsible for work done on their property by their own son that ended up cutting through 40% of my arm.

Perhaps their negligence is the fact that they didn't supervise the work close enough but they did oversee much of the days activity with David. Just because Dave was doing the work doesn't mean they were not trying to tell their kid what to do. They told him plenty of times throughout the day what to do. How is that not supervising?

Paul
Paul Dulberg
847-497-4250
Sent from my iPad

On Nov 18, 2013, at 8:07 PM, Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net> wrote:

Paul whether you like it or not they don't have a legal liability for your injury because they were not directing the work. So if we do not accept their 5000 they will simply file a motion and get out of the case for free. That's the only other option is letting them file motion getting out of the case

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 18, 2013, at 7:40 PM, Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net> wrote:

Only 5, That's not much at all.
Is this a take it or leave it or do we have any other options?

If you want a negligence case for the homeowners ask what happened immediately after the accident.

Neither of them offered me any medical assistance nor did either of them call 911 and all Carol could think of besides calling David an idiot was calling her homeowners insurance.



They all left me out in the yard screaming for help while they were busy making sure they were covered.

She even went as far as to finally call the Emergency Room after I was already there just to tell me she was covered.

How selfish are people when they worry about if their insured over helping the person who was hurt and bleeding badly in their yard.

I'm glad she got her answer and had to share it with me only to find out her coverage won't even pay the medical bills.

I'm not happy with the offer.

As far as John Choyinski, he knows he has to call you and said he will tomorrow.

Paul

Paul Dulberg
847-497-4250
Sent from my iPad

On Nov 18, 2013, at 1:28 PM, Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net> wrote:

I'm waiting to hear from John. I tried calling him last week, but no one answered.

In addition, the McGuire's atty has offered us (you) \$5,000 in full settlement of the claim against the McGuires only. As we discussed, they have no liability in the case for what Dave did as property owners. So they will likely get out of the case on a motion at some point, so my suggestion is to take the \$5,000 now. You probably won't see any of it due to liens etc. but it will offset the costs deducted from any eventual recovery....

Let me know what you think..

Hans

----- Original Message -----

From: Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net>

To: Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net>

Sent: Fri, 15 Nov 2013 22:41:26 -0000 (UTC)

Subject: Dave's Best and oldest friend John

Hans,

Just spoke with John Choyinski again about talking with you.

I am leaving your number with him as he has agreed to talk with you about David Gagnon.


I believe he will try and call sometime tomorrow.

Paul

Oh and I know that nothing that happened right after the incident makes any difference as to the validity of the injuries but David's conduct immediately after the incident does show his lack of moral values for other humans and what he was willing and was not willing to do to help me get medical help. For his actions towards me or any other human being is enough to sue the shit out him alone. It is the things that happened afterwards that upset me the most.

Sorry for the rant but Dave was a complete ass all the way and deserves this.

Paul Dulberg
847-497-4250
Sent from my iPad



The Law Offices of Thomas J. Popovich P.C.

3416 W. ELM STREET
McHENRY, ILLINOIS 60050
TELEPHONE: 815.344.3797
FACSIMILE: 815.344.5280
www.popovichlaw.com

THOMAS J. POPOVICH
HANS A. MAST
JOHN A. KORNAK

MARK J. VOGG
JAMES P. TUTAJ
ROBERT J. LUMBER
THERESA M. FREEMAN

January 24, 2014

Paul Dulberg
4606 Hayden Court
McHenry, IL 60051

RE: *Paul Dulberg vs. David Gagnon, Caroline McGuire and Bill McGuire*
McHenry County Case: 12 LA 178

Dear Paul:

Please find enclosed the General Release and Settlement Agreement from defense counsel for Caroline and Bill McGuire. Please Release and return it to me in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope at your earliest convenience.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Very truly yours,

COPY
HANS A. MAST

smg
Enclosure



WAUKESHA OFFICE
210 NORTH MARTIN LUTHER
KING JR. AVENUE
WAUKESHA, IL 60085

GENERAL RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

NOW COMES PAUL DULBERG, and in consideration of the payment of Five-Thousand (\$5,000.00) Dollars to him, by or on behalf of the WILLIAM MCGUIRE and CAROLYN MCGUIRE (aka Bill McGuire; improperly named as Caroline McGuire) and AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, the payment and receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, PAUL DULBERG does hereby release and discharge the WILLIAM MCGUIRE and CAROLYN MCGUIRE and AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, and any agents or employees of the WILLIAM MCGUIRE and CAROLYN MCGUIRE and AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, of and from any and all causes of action, claims and demands of whatsoever kind or nature including, but not limited to, any claim for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a certain chain saw incident that allegedly occurred on or about June 28, 2011, within and upon the premises known commonly as 1016 West Elder Avenue, City of McHenry, County of McHenry, State of Illinois.

IT IS FURTHER AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD that there is presently pending a cause of action in the Circuit Court of the 22nd Judicial Circuit, McHenry County, Illinois entitled "Paul Dulberg, Plaintiff, vs. David Gagnon, Individually, and as agent of Caroline McGuire and Bill McGuire, and Caroline McGuire and Bill McGuire, Individually, Defendants", Cause No. 2012 LA 178, and that this settlement is contingent upon WILLIAM MCGUIRE and CAROLYN MCGUIRE being dismissed with prejudice as parties to said lawsuit pursuant to a finding by the Circuit Court that the settlement between the parties constitutes a good faith settlement for purposes of the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act, 740 ILCS 100/0.01, *et seq.*

IT IS FURTHER AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD that as part of the consideration for this agreement the undersigned represents and warrants as follows (check applicable boxes):

- ☐ I was not 65 or older on the date of the occurrence.
- ☐ I was not receiving SSI or SSDI on the date of the occurrence.
- ☐ I am not eligible to receive SSI or SSDI.
- ☐ I am not currently receiving SSI or SSDI.

IT IS FURTHER AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD:

- a. That any subrogated claims or liens for medical expenses paid by or on behalf of PAUL DULBERG shall be the responsibility PAUL DULBERG, including, but not limited to, any Medicare liens. Any and all reimbursements of medical expenses to subrogated parties, including Medicare's rights of reimbursement, if any, shall be PAUL DULBERG's responsibility, and not the responsibility of the parties released herein.
- b. That any outstanding medical expenses are PAUL DULBERG's responsibility and all payment of medical expenses hereafter shall be PAUL DULBERG's responsibility, and not the responsibility of the parties released

- c. That PAUL DULBERG agrees to save and hold harmless and indemnify the parties released herein against any claims made by any medical providers, including, but not limited to Medicare or parties subrogated to the rights to recover medical or Medicare payments.

IT IS FURTHER AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD by the parties hereto that this agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties with regard to materials set forth herein, and shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, jointly and severally, and the executors, conservators, administrators, guardians, personal representatives, heirs and successors of each.

IT IS FURTHER AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD that this settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and no liability is admitted as a consequence hereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the dates set forth below.

Dated: _____

PAUL DULBERG

STATE OF ILLINOIS)
) SS.
COUNTY OF MCHENRY)

PAUL DULBERG personally appeared before me this date and acknowledged that she executed the foregoing Release and Settlement Agreement as his own free act and deed for the uses and purposes set forth therein.

Dated this _____ day of January, 2014.

Notary Public

From: Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net>
Subject: Fwd: McGuire settlement
Date: December 28, 2016 10:21:55 AM CST
To: paul_dulberg@comcast.net

From: Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net>
Date: January 29, 2014 at 1:59:31 PM CST
To: Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net>
Subject: Re: McGuire settlement

Ok, it's signed and in the mail.

Hope that some yahoo in the govt. doesn't someday decide to go after everyone they think they might get a dollar out of and end up holding me responsible for the McGuire's fees incurred while they fight it out.

I'm not in the business of warranting, insuring or protecting the McGuire's from government. Especially for only 5 grand. For that kind of protection it could cost millions but I trust your judgement.

Paul

Paul Dulberg
847-497-4250
Sent from my iPad

On Jan 29, 2014, at 11:49 AM, Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net> wrote:

SSD has to be part of it...its not going to effect anything...
We can't prevent disclosure of the amount...

----- Original Message -----

From: Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net>
To: Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net>
Sent: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 17:47:39 -0000 (UTC)
Subject: Re: McGuire settlement

What and why do those questions have any relevance at all and why do they need to be part of this agreement?
Particularly the one about being eligible.

Also, I cannot warranty against what SSDI, Medicare or any other government institution wishes to do.

Is it possible to make this agreement blind to the McGuire's or David Gagnon?

What I mean is can we make it so that the amount of money cannot be told to them in any way?

It would drive David's ego crazy if he thought it was a large sum and was banned from seeing how much it is.

Paul Dulberg
847-497-4250

Sent from my iPad

On Jan 29, 2014, at 10:51 AM, Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net> wrote:

Its not a big deal...if you weren't receiving it than don't check it...not sure what the question is...

----- Original Message -----

From: Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net>
To: Hans Mast <hansmast@comcast.net>
Sent: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 16:16:04 -0000 (UTC)
Subject: McGuire settlement

Here is a copy of the first page.

It has check boxes and one of the check boxes says;

I am not eligible to receive SSI or SSDI.

Another says;

I am not receiving SSI or SSDI.

As you know, I have applied for SSDI and SSI



From: Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net>
Subject: Fwd: Memo
Date: December 27, 2016 6:11:20 PM CST
To: paul_dulberg@comcast.net

From: Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net>
Date: February 22, 2015 at 7:42:25 PM CST
To: Hans Mast <hansmast@att.net>
Subject: Re: Memo

To believe David's version of events you must believe I was committing suicide.
Who in their right mind puts his arm into a chainsaw?

I figured you would cop out again...

Now I'm left wondering...
How hard is it to sue an atty?

And yes I am and have been looking for someone who will take this case...

The issue of my word vs David Gagnons... Did he cut me or did I cut myself?

Of coarse he cut me.

Next issue please?

Paul Dulberg
847-497-4250
Sent from my iPad

On Feb 22, 2015, at 7:20 PM, Hans Mast <hansmast@att.net> wrote:

Paul I no longer can represent you in the case. We obviously have differences of opinion as to the value of the case. I've been telling you over a year now the problems with the case and you just don't see them. You keep telling me how injured you are and completely ignore that it doesn't matter if you passed away from the accident because we still have to prove that the defendant was at fault. While you think it is very clear - it is not. My guess is that seven out of 10 times you will lose the case outright. That means zero. That's why I have been trying to convince you to agree to a settlement. You clearly do not want to. There's only \$100,000 in coverage. Allstate will never offer anything near the policy limits therefore there's no chance to settle the case. The only alternative is to take the case to trial and I am not interested in doing that. I will wait for you to find a new attorney. I can't assist you any further in this case. Just let me know.

Sent from my iPhone

On Feb 22, 2015, at 7:14 PM, Paul Dulberg <pdulberg@comcast.net> wrote:

Let's not be harsh, We have a couple of weeks till dr Kujawa's billing arrives.
I agree showing me the memo is a good idea it's just not the accuracy I expected.
I know I'm being confrontative about all of this but let's face it, my working days are over let alone a career I have been building since I was in high school. My dreams of family are over unless I have enough to provide and pay for the care of children and a roof.
What's left for me?
Facebook, scrap booking, crafts, etc... A life of crap...
With ongoing pain and grip issues in my dominate arm/hand that are degenerative.

This is as total as it gets for us in the working class short of being paralyzed or dead.

I need someone who is on my side, top of their game and will see to it that I'm comfortable after all this is over.

What I feel is an attempt to settle for far less than this is remotely worth just to get me off the books.





Binding Mediation Award

Paul Dulberg

v.

ADR Systems File # 33391BMAG

David Gagnon

On December 8, 2016, the matter was called for binding mediation before the Honorable James P. Etchingham, (Ret.), in Chicago, IL. According to the agreement entered into by the parties, if a voluntary settlement through negotiation could not be reached the mediator would render a settlement award which would be binding to the parties. Pursuant to that agreement the mediator finds as follows:

Finding in favor of:

Paul Dulberg

Gross Award:

\$660,000.

Comparative fault:


15

% (if applicable)

Net Award:

\$561,000

Comments/Explanation

Medical\$ 60,000.Future medical\$ 200,000.Lost Wage\$ 250,000.PIS75,000.LNL75,000.

 The Honorable James P. Etchingham, (Ret.)
